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Anatomical, clinical, and neuroimaging evidence implicates the cerebellum in processing
emotions and feelings. Moreover recent studies showed a cerebellar involvement
in pathologies such as autism, schizophrenia and alexithymia, in which emotional
processing have been found altered. However, cerebellar function in the modulation
of emotional responses remains debated. In this study, emotions that are involved
directly in decision-making were examined in 15 patients (six males; age range 17–60
years) affected by cerebellar damage and 15 well matched healthy controls. We used
a gambling task, in which subjects’ choices and evaluation of outcomes with regard
to their anticipated and actual emotional impact were analyzed. Emotions, such as
regret and relief, were elicited, based on the outcome of the unselected gamble.
Interestingly, despite their ability to avoid regret in subsequent choices, patients affected
by cerebellar lesions were significantly impaired in evaluating the feeling of regret
subjectively. These results demonstrate that the cerebellum is involved in conscious
recognizing of negative feelings caused by the sense of self-responsibility for an incorrect
decision.
Keywords: choice behavior, cortico-cerebellar circuits, emotion, gambling, self-monitoring, social cognition,
autism spectrum disorders, alexithymia
Introduction
Counterfactual reasoning is a cognitive mechanism that allows one to evaluate and compare
what is obtained with what would have been acquired if a different choice had been made. Thus,
counterfactually people will react emotionally to what has been obtained and to the alternative
unobtained outcome. Ultimately, counterfactual thinking refers to the generation of alternatives to
factual events and appears to be a pervasive feature of normal cognition. Specifically, counterfactual
thoughts highlight causal relationships between choices and outcomes, thereby suggesting future
courses of action that might be implemented strategically to facilitate adaptive behavior (Byrne,
2002). Moreover, counterfactual thinking is more related to negative emotions, regret and
disappointment, than to positive emotions (Rose, 1997).
Whereas disappointment arises when a negative outcome occurs independently of our decisions,
regret occurs exclusively when the outcome results from bad decisions. Thus, regret differs from
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 1 May 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 113
Clausi et al. Cerebellum and feeling of regret
disappointment, because the former is related to a strong
sense of personal responsibility. The experience of regret has
a powerful influence on subsequent behavioral choices—its
anticipation leads to an adjustment of subsequent decisions
(‘‘regret-aversive’’ behavior) to minimize ensuing regrettable
experiences (Zeelenberg et al., 1996; Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli
et al., 2005).
Neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies have
demonstrated a dissociation between disappointment and
regret. Whereas disappointment correlates with activation in
the middle temporal gyrus and dorsal brainstem (Coricelli
et al., 2005), the orbitofrontal cortex has been shown to be an
important region for the experience and anticipation of regret
(Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005; Chua et al., 2009).
For instance, patients with lesions in the orbitofrontal cortex do
not report regret or anticipate it in subsequent choices (Camille
et al., 2004). A reduced feeling of regret was also recently found
in patients with autism spectrum disorders (Zalla et al., 2014), in
which cerebellar structural and functional alterations have been
largely described (Fatemi et al., 2012).
Several studies have reported cerebellar activation during
tasks that involve decision-making processes (Guggisberg et al.,
2008; Rosenbloom et al., 2012). The cerebellum has also been
proposed to function in decision-making tasks as a detector
of error signals to improve future performance (Ernst et al.,
2002). These studies clearly implicate the cerebellum in decision-
making processes. Although the cerebellum has been linked to
the modulation of cognitive and emotional behaviors, based
on its large anatomical and functional connections through
the dentate nuclei with the prefrontal, temporo-parietal, and
limbic areas (Schmahmann, 2010; D’Angelo and Casali, 2013),
whether the cerebellum functions in integrating the emotional
and cognitive components during decision-making has not been
examined and could be of interest in order to clarify its role in
pathologies such as schizophrenia, autism and alexithymia.
We studied the involvement of the cerebellum in feeling
disappointment and regret, specifically seeking to determine
whether a damage in this region impairs the ability to report
regret or incorporate regret into the decision-making process to
improve future choices. To this end, we implemented the regret
gambling task, developed originally by Mellers et al. (1999) and
adapted by Camille et al. (2004).
Materials and Methods
Subjects
Fifteen right-handed patients (six males), recruited at IRCCS
Santa Lucia Foundation Rehabilitation Hospital and affected
by cerebellar damage, participated in the study. Gender,
mean age, and mean years of education are reported in
Table 1.
Patients were affected by degenerative (N = 10), focal
unilateral (N = 4), and bilateral (N = 1) cerebellar lesions.
Subjects with degenerative pathologies were affected by
Friedreich ataxia (N = 3), spinocerebellar ataxia type 2 (SCA
2) (N = 3), SCA 15 (N = 2), SCA 28 (N = 1) and idiopathic
cerebellar ataxia (ICA) (N = 1) (Table 2).
Focal lesions resulted from ischemic stroke or surgical
ablation due to arteriovenous malformations or tumors.
The lesion characteristics of patients with focal damage,
according to the MRI images, are described in Figure 1 and
Table 2.
All patients underwent a neurological examination, and
their motor impairment was quantified using the International
Cooperative Ataxia Rating Scale (ICARS; Trouillas et al., 1997),
which ranges from 0 (absence of any deficit) to 100 (presence of
all deficits to the highest degree). Subscale score for the kinetic
limbs range from 0 to 52 (Table 1).
Fifteen subjects without a history of neurological or
psychiatric illness who were recruited from a pool of patients’
relatives and volunteers formed the healthy control group.
Controls were matched for gender, age, education, and
intellectual level (assessed by Raven’s 47 Progressive Matrices)
(PM47; Raven, 1947; Table 1).
The experimental procedures were approved by the ethical
committee of IRCCS Santa Lucia Foundation (CE-PROG.2-
AG4-187), and written consent was obtained from each subject
per the Helsinki Declaration.
Neuropsychological Assessment
The patients’ general cognitive profiles were assessed using
subtests of the Mental Deterioration Battery (BDM; Caltagirone
et al., 1995). Specifically, we considered PM47 to be a
measure of general cognitive ability. Praxis was measured by
freehand copying of a drawing and drawing with landmarks
(Gainotti et al., 1977). Verbal memory and visuospatial working
memory (Carlesimo et al., 1996) were evaluated through
digit span, the Corsi test (Corsi, 1972), and an immediate
visual recognition task. FAS verbal fluency was used to
measure verbal production (Borkowsky et al., 1967). Sentence
comprehension and executive functions were examined with the
Token test and the Wisconsin card sorting test, respectively
(De Renzi and Vignolo, 1962; Heaton et al., 2006). Visual
exploration was evaluated by barrage tasks (line cancellation
task and double line cancellation tasks) (Albert, 1973; Zazzo,
1980).
TABLE 1 | Groups’ characteristics.
Gender m/f Age mean (s.d.) Education level mean
(s.d.)
Intellectual level
mean (s.d.)
ICARS: kinetic mean
score (s.d.)
ICARS: total mean score
(s.d.)
Patients 6/9 42.8 (10.8) 14 (3.2) 28.7 (2.3) 16.43 (11.1) 39.97 (24.04)
Controls 6/9 41.9 (11.6) 14.5 (2.9) 30.7 (1.5) / /
m = males; f = females; Intellectual level was evaluated by PM47; s.d. = standard deviations; ICARS = International Co-operative Ataxia Rating Scale (Trouillas et al., 1997).
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TABLE 2 | Patients’ lesion characteristics.
Case Lesion Side Etiology DCN ANT POST Hem Vermis
B.A. Focal R Surgical x x x x x
B.F. Atrophic / ICA - - - - -
C.P. Focal B Surgical x - x x x
C.M. Atrophic / Friedreich - - - - -
R.S. Atrophic / Friedreich - - - - -
R.F. Atrophic / Friedreich - - - - -
S.S. Focal R Surgical x x x -
Sm.S. Focal R Surgical x x x - x
T.S. Atrophic / SCA2 - - - - -
Z.E. Focal R Ischemic x x x x x
L.I. Atrophic / SCA2 - - - - -
S.C. Atrophic / SCA28 - - - - -
V.D. Atrophic / SCA15 - - - - -
V.C. Atrophic / SCA15 - - - - -
M.V. Atrophic / SCA2 - - - - -
R = right; B = bilateral; SCA = spinocerebellar atrophy; DCN = deep cerebellar nuclei; ANT = anterior cerebellar lobe; POST = posterior cerebellar lobe; Hem = cerebellar
hemisphere.
Decision-Making Tasks
The decision-making behavior of patients and control subjects
was assessed using the counterfactual inference test and the
gambling task.
Counterfactual Inference Test
The Counterfactual Inference Test (CIT; Hooker et al., 2000)
was used to measure the counterfactual reasoning. The CIT
is a questionnaire that comprises 4 forced-choice questions.
This test assumes that counterfactuals are more pronounced
when the relationship between previous actions and the outcome
is unusual or when there is increased physical and temporal
proximity between the alternative situations.
Some example questions are: (i) ‘‘Ann gets sick after eating
at a restaurant that she often visits. Sarah gets sick after eating
at a restaurant that she has never visited before. Who is more
upset about her choice of restaurant?’’ (ii) ‘‘Ed is attacked by
a mugger only 10 feet from his house. James is attacked by
a mugger 1 mile from his house. Who is more upset by the
mugging?’’
In a normal population, the target responses are Sarah for
the first item and Ed for the second. The scale ranges from 0
(no counterfactual thinking) to 4 (perfect ability with regard
to counterfactual thinking). For each item, events that are
experienced by two individuals are presented, and three possible
responses are given. Correct and incorrect responses are scored 1
and 0, respectively.
Gambling Task
We adopted the gambling task that has been used by Camille
et al. (2004). The task was projected onto a computer monitor.
In each trial, subjects chose between two bets, on two ‘‘wheels of
fortune’’. The wheels had 2 segments (gray and black) that were
randomly associated with various probabilities (0.2, 0.5, and 0.8)
of winning or losing a specific amount of virtual money (200, 50,
−50,−200). The length of each segment was proportional to the
probability of an outcome (Figure 2).
At the start of the trial, the participant chose one of the two
wheels (left or right) by using the keyboard (the subject had
to press the key ‘‘V’’ and ‘‘N’’ respectively). Then, the bet was
highlighted by a white square, and an arrow appeared in the
center of the gamble and began to rotate. Two conditions were
run: (i) partial; and (ii) complete. In the partial condition, the
spinning arrow appeared only in the selected wheel, rotated for
varying durations, and stopped in one of the two sectors. Only
the outcome of the selected wheel was shown. In this condition,
the subject could only evaluate the obtained and unobtained
outcomes of the bet.
In the complete condition, rotating arrows appeared in
the selected and unselected wheels, and when they stopped
(simultaneously), they indicated the outcomes of the bet and the
unchosen bet. Thus, complete feedback trials allowed the subjects
to compare the outcome that was obtained in the selected gamble
with that of the unchosen wheel and determine the financial
consequence of their decision with regard to the advantageous
and disadvantageous choice. The experimental design included
a practice session of 5 trials that covered both conditions
(partial and complete). Partial and complete conditions were
counterbalanced across subjects.
At the end of each trial, subjects rated their affective states
on a scale from −50 (extremely sad) to +50 (extremely happy).
The affective states were joy (from 0 to +50) and disappointment
(from 0 to −50) for the partial condition and relief (from 0 to
+50) and regret (from 0 to−50) for the complete condition. The
subject used the mouse to move a cursor along the rating line.
To analyze the main components of the subjects’ choice
behavior, the following parameters were considered per Camille
et al. (2004) and Coricelli et al. (2005):
- emotional self-evaluation, represented by self-reported
emotional evaluation that indicates the valence and intensity
of the affective response to the outcome of their choices;
- choice behavior, which refers to the tendency to minimize
negative emotions and maximize final outcomes. We
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FIGURE 1 | Subjects with focal cerebellar lesions. Lesion extensions
were assessed on 3D-T1-MPRAGEs after spatial normalization and overlaid
onto a coronal T1-weighted template from Schmahmann et al. (2000). For
each subject, the lesion is shown in two representative coronal sections. The
case code is as in Table 2.
measured (a) the minimization of future disappointment,
wherein a subject chose a bet that minimized the difference
between the lowest and highest outcomes, weighted by the
probability of the worst possible outcome; (b) anticipation of
future regret, in which a subject minimized the discrepancy
between the obtained and unobtained outcomes across the
two bets; and (c) maximization of expected values, in which
a subject computed the sum of the outcomes of each bet,
weighted by their probabilities, and chose the bet with the
highest expected value.
- net earnings that were realized at the end of the partial or
complete condition.
Skin Conductance Response
Simultaneously the gambling task, the skin conductance response
(SCR) was recorded in a group of 5 patients (age: mean = 49.8;
FIGURE 2 | Schematic of the regret gambling task. Each subject was
required to choose the more advantageous alternative between two wheels of
fortune shown on a monitor. Each wheel (upper part of the figure) has 2
sectors associated with different value pairs. Possible outcomes are formed
by any pair of combinations of the following values: 50, −50, 200, −200
(virtual money—ve) and are indicated above the wheel. Each value is randomly
associated with one of three outcome probabilities (0.8, 0.2, 0.5). The length
of each segment (gray and black segments) indicates the outcome probability.
In the choice phase, the subject selects one of two wheels, and a rectangular
box appears around the selected wheel (upper right of the figure). In the
outcome phase of the partial condition blocks, a spinning arrow appears only
in the selected wheel and stops in 1 of the 2 segments. Only the outcome of
the selected wheel can be seen (middle left of figure). In the outcome phase of
the complete condition blocks, a spinning arrow appears in both the selected
and unselected wheels. The arrows rotate and stop, allowing the subject to
view the outcomes of both wheels (middle right of figure). At the end of each
trial, the subject has to rate his affective state by visual analogical scale (VAS)
rating from –50 (extremely sad) to 50 (extremely happy) (lower part of the
figure).
s.d. = 5.6; education level: mean = 16.2; s.d. = 2.5) and 5 controls
(age: mean = 47.4; s.d. = 9.2; education level: mean = 16.6; s.d. =
2.2). The SCR recording allows us to have a physiological index
of the autonomic emotional reactivity (Dawson et al., 2007).
AD-Instruments PowerLab 8/35 and ML116 GSR Amplifier
(providing low constant-voltage AC excitation (22 mVrms @
75 Hz)) devices were used as signal amplifier with specific GSR
sensors consisting of two bipolar finger electrodes. The sensors
were applied on the distal phalanx of the index andmiddle fingers
of the left hand. The signal was sampled at 1 KHz and recorded
using the software LabChart 7 (AD-Instruments, Inc.).
Data Analysis
The analysis was conducted with the statistical software package
Stata, Stata Corp, College Station, TX. Nonparametric tests were
applied on the behavioral data sets.
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Specifically, the Mann-Whitney test was used to appraise the
statistical significance between-group differences: (a) on the CIT
questionnaire score that explored counterfactual reasoning; and
(b) on the net gains that were realized by patients and controls
in the partial and complete feedback conditions. To examine the
‘‘self-evaluation of the emotional component’’ the mean scores
obtained on the emotional rating scale by each subject for each
affective state were analyzed by theMann-WhitneyU test and the
Wilcoxon sign rank test to evaluate between-group and within-
group differences, respectively.
Following Camille et al. (2004) and Coricelli et al. (2005),
the effects of anticipated emotions on the performance in the
regret gambling task were assessed by panel logit regression, in
which each participants binary scores across repeated gambling
trials were predicted by trial characteristics (i.e., minimization
of future disappointment, anticipation of future regret and
maximization of options expected value) controlling for each
participant intra-individual variability.
Finally, Spearman rank order correlations were used to assess
the statistical associations of emotional self-evaluation ratings
with the net earnings in the complete feedback condition.
Skin conductance signal of each participant was band pass
filtered using a 2 Hz low-pass and 0.05 Hz high-pass filter. For
each trial, the difference between the maximum value detected
in a 5-s post-stimulus time window and the baseline calculated
as the average value of a 0.3 s pre-stimulus time window
was computed (Romano et al., 2014). Before carrying out any
analyses on SCR amplitudes, the dataset was tested for normality
with the Shapiro-Wilk test. The data were normally distributed
(Shapiro-Wilk test all conditions: p > 0.1). Thus, parametrical
analysis including a mixed two way-repeated-measures ANOVA
was used using Feedback (Partial vs. Complete) and Affective
State (Disappointment/Joy and Regret/Relief) as within factors
and Group (Controls vs. Patients) as between factor. When
appropriate, the analyses were corrected by Duncan post hoc test.
Results
General Neuropsychological Assessment
Cerebellar patients showed no deficits on the general
neuropsychological assessment. Their scores on this assessment
(Table 3) and on Raven’s PM47 (Table 1) were within the normal
range.
Counterfactual Inference Test
The performance of cerebellar patients on the CIT questionnaire
did not differ from that of control subjects when asked to draw
inferences about hypothetical social events (Mann-Whitney: Z =
0.08; p = 0.93). Thus, the cerebellar damage in our patients
cohort does not affect the ability to generate alternative mental
representations of past events with respect to the course of actual
facts.
Gambling task
Self-Evaluation of Emotional Component
The explicit processing of the psychological component,
associated with the outcome of the choice, was analyzed through
TABLE 3 | Patients’ neuropsychological profile.
Tasks Mean (s.d.) Cut-off
Memory
Digit span forward 6.1 (1.4) 7 ± 2
Digit span backward 4.8 (1.2) 5 ± 2
Spatial forward 7.7 (1) 7 ± 2
Spatial backward 4.5 (0.9) 5 ± 2
Immediate Visual Memory 19.7 (0.6) 13.8
Visuospatial analysis
Simple Barrage (errors) 0.07 (0.3) /
Double Barrage (errors) 0.8 (0..9) /
Constructional praxis
Copying drawings with land. 65.7 (4.8) 61.8
Copying drawings 10.1 (2..2) 7.1
Language
FAS 29.7 (11) 17.3
Token test 32.4 (1.8) 32
Executive functions
WCST: Total errors score 50◦–70◦ <10◦
Patients performances are expressed in corrected scores; the performances
obtained in Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) are expressed in percentile of
raw score.
self-evaluation of the affective state, as measured using an
emotional rating scale that was administered at the end of
each trial. In the partial and complete feedback conditions,
the participants expressed their degree of emotional experience
(happiness/dissatisfaction) with regard to the outcome of their
choice.
The partial condition triggered the emotional responses of
disappointment or joy. In the partial feedback condition, as
expected, all subjects expressed the positive emotion of joy when
the obtained outcome was higher than the unobtained outcome
of the bet and the negative emotion of disappointment when the
unobtained outcome was more advantageous than the obtained
outcome.
No significant differences emerged in joy or disappointment
between patients and controls (joy: Mann-Whitney Z = −1.14;
p = 0.25; disappointment: Mann-Whitney Z = − 0.85; p = 0.39)
(Figure 3).
In the complete feedback condition, when the obtained
outcome was more advantageous than the outcome of the
unchosen gamble, the affective rating was always positive.
Patients and control subjects expressed relief, which did not
differ between groups (Mann-Whitney: Z = −0.77; p = 0.44). In
contrast, compared with controls, cerebellar patients experienced
significantly less regret when the outcome of the selected bet was
lower than that of the unchosen gamble (Mann-Whitney: Z =
−2.21; p = 0.027) (Figure 3).
Furthermore, within groups comparisons did not show
any significant difference between the means scores of regret
and disappointment in the cerebellar patients (Wilcoxon sign
rank test: Z = 0.39; p = 0.69). Conversely, the control
subjects report a significantly higher level of regret than
of disappointment (Wilcoxon sign rank test: Z = −2.61;
p = 0.009).
These results indicate that cerebellar patients were unable
to explicit their negative feeling when they are required to
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FIGURE 3 | Emotional rating, expressed as mean score of self-evaluation of the outcome of past choices in partial feedback and complete feedback
conditions. * p < 0.05.
self-evaluate the outcome of their choice in the regret condition.
Moreover, unlike control subjects the patients did not report the
negative emotional feeling to a regret-inducing event as more
intense than that of a disappointment-inducing event.
Choice Behavior
To determine whether the choices made by patients with
cerebellar lesions were guided by disappointment, regret, or
expected values, we adopted a choice model framework that has
been used for this gambling task (Camille et al., 2004). Primarily
by using this model, we examined whether patients chose to
avoid regret. This analysis was performed exclusively on the data
from the complete condition, which was the only condition to
provide information on the outcome of the unchosen gamble
that could have elicited feelings of regret (Camille et al., 2004;
Coricelli et al., 2005). The subjects’ choice behavior was evaluated
with respect to minimizing disappointment and regret and
maximization of expected values (Table 4).
By regression analysis, patients chose by maximizing the
expected value (p < 0.001) and minimizing future regret
TABLE 4 | Regression analysis on subjects’ choice behavior.
Variable Coefficient Standard error Z P
Constant CB 0.100 0.134 0.74 0.46
C 0.403 0.161 2.5 0.012
Disappointment CB −0.0004 0.002 −0.26 0.79
C −0.0002 0.002 −0.14 0.89
Regret CB 0.003 0.001 2.62 0.009
C 0.006 0.001 4.48 0.0001
Expected value CB 0.0189 0.002 6.35 0.0001
C 0.027 0.001 7.19 0.0001
Regression analysis (panel logit procedure with individual random effect) on patients’ and controls’ choice behavior as a function of anticipated disappointment, anticipated
regret and maximization of expected value in the “complete” condition. Patients (CB): number of subjects = 15; number of observations = 428 (two patients did not
complete the task); Log likelihood = −176.33375; Wald χ2(3) = 115.7; Prob > χ2 = 0.00001. The dependent variable “choice” is equal to 1 if subject chose gamble one
and is equal to 0 if subject chose gamble two. Controls (C): number of subjects = 15; number of observations = 450; Log likelihood = −136.80278; Wald χ2(3) = 115.01;
Prob > χ2 = 0.00001. The dependent variable “choice” is equal to 1 if subject chose gamble one and is equal to 0 if subject chose gamble two.
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FIGURE 4 | Skin conductance response (SCR) means as a function of
Feedback (partial vs. complete) and Affective State (disappointment/
joy and regret/relief) factors. P-values correspond to Duncan test
correction for the significant effects. Error bars indicate standard deviation of
the mean.
(p< 0.01) (Table 4). The data on total earnings confirmed that
patients and healthy controls did not differ in terms of choice
behavior.
In each condition of the gambling task, with regard to
earnings, the patients made a net gain, which did not differ
from the gain in the control group (partial condition: Mann-
Whitney’sU = 105;Z = 0.31; p = 0.75; complete condition:Mann-
Whitney’sU = 99.5; Z =−0.54; p = 0.59). We did not observe any
correlation between the emotional evaluation rating and the net
earnings in patients (regret: r = 0.40; p = 0.13; relief: r = 0.22; p =
0.41) or controls (regret: r = −0.05; p = 0.85; relief: r = 0.04; p =
0.86) in the complete feedback condition.
Skin Conductance Responses
Statistical analysis revealed (Figure 4) that the SCRs were
significantly modulated by the within interaction between
Feedback and Affective State factors (F(1,8) = 9.991, p = 0.013;
p2 = 0.55; power = 0.790). Within-group comparisons revealed
higher amplitude of SCR in the Regret condition (mean in
µSiemens ± s.d.; 0.55 ± 0.07) respect to Disappointment (0.51
± 0.02; p < 0.001), Joy (0.50 ± 0.03; p < 0.001), and Relief
condition (0.51 ± 0.03, p < 0.001). Comparison evidenced
also a significant difference between Disappointment and Joy
condition (p = 0.036). No groupmain effect, interactions or other
comparisons were significant (p> 0.1).
These results indicate that the cerebellar patients showed an
autonomic emotional reactivity comparable with control group.
In both groups the SCRs were significantly higher in the regret
condition than in the other conditions.
Discussion
Our data demonstrate that cerebellar damage impairs the self-
rating of feeling of regret. Regret is an emotion that is associated
with a decision that turns out badly. It embodies the concept
of liability for one’s incorrect past voluntary decision. Thus, the
experience of regret has a significant influence on subsequent
behavioral choices, culminating in the anticipation of this feeling
to avoid further negative experiences.
This process has been examined using the gambling task
paradigm used in Camille et al. (2004) in which subjects are
required to choose between two gambles, each with different
probabilities and expected outcomes. Regret is elicited by
providing information on the outcome of the unchosen gamble
(Coricelli et al., 2005). In our analysis, we focused on 3
parameters: choice behavior, self-rating of the outcome of
choice, and autonomic response (i.e., SCR). Cerebellar patients
and healthy controls developed similar patterns of choice
behavior—i.e., they anticipated regret and maximized expected
values. This result indicates that subjects with cerebellar lesions,
unlike those with OFC damage (Camille et al., 2004), do not fail
to anticipate the possible consequences of their choices and thus
learn to avoid choices that predict future regret correctly. The
integrity of the cognitive component of the choice behavior was
confirmed by their performance on the CIT. Cerebellar patients
had normal CIT scores, demonstrating that their capacity to
generate inferences by counterfactual thinking properly was
intact.
Moreover the SCR analyses evidenced that the autonomic
response in cerebellar patients were comparable to that of
controls in the different conditions of the gambling task.
Different studies in animals debated the role of the
cerebellum in autonomic response to fear conditioning,
hypothesizing that lesions of the cerebellar vermis may affect
fear memory without altering baseline motor/autonomic
responses to the frightening stimuli (Supple and Leaton, 1990;
Sacchetti et al., 2009).
Autonomic responses are considered an index of the
activation of the somatic state that is caused by the emotional
experience. A normal autonomic reactivity was also described
during the anticipation of disadvantageous choices in a patient
affected by left cerebellar stroke (Annoni et al., 2003).
In the present study, although choice strategy and regret
anticipation were preserved, the cerebellar patients experienced a
significant impairment to regret self-rating. Indeed, although the
cerebellar patients showed a higher arousal for regret compared
to the other emotional events, their conscious perception of this
negative emotion was lower than that of controls. Judgment of
other feelings did not differ between groups.
These data are in line with recent evidences from rodents that
support a cerebellar role in learned fear (Sacchetti et al., 2009)
as demonstrated by amnesic effects of tetrodotoxin injected into
the vermis after a repeatedly paired conditioned stimulus with a
noxious unconditioned stimulus (Sacchetti et al., 2002).
Furthermore, interference with cerebellar activity by
transcranial direct current stimulation affects the processing of
negative but not positive emotions (Ferrucci et al., 2012; Ferrucci
and Priori, 2014).
Overall, in the present study cerebellar patients made their
choices trying to minimize the future regret; however they were
unable to self-monitor it correctly.
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FIGURE 5 | Per Coricelli et al. (2007), the circuitry of regret comprises
the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), anterior cingulated cortex
(ACC), and hippocampus (Hyp). Regret-related activity in the ACC
corresponds to the dorsal component of the ACC and thus its cognitive
division. Hippocampal activity is consistent with the declarative component of
regret. The interplay of the ACC and Hyp, in addition to the OFC, suggests that
regret is elicited through a cognitive (top-down modulation) and declarative
process. In addition of these structures, the amygdale is a critical component of
a brain circuit involved in the appraisal of self-relevant events that include social
stimuli (Zalla and Sperduti, 2013). Based on our data, we hypothesize that the
cerebellum (CB) functions in this neural circuit. In estimating regret, the subject
must compare the basic emotional state (internal state) and the state
determined by the external event, based on the gambling result (external event).
Considering the cerebellar involvement in estimating the state (Molinari et al.,
2009), we propose that cerebellar processing intervenes specifically in the
internal state vs. external event comparison.
Coricelli et al. (2005) associated the experience of regret with
a neural network that comprised the medial orbitofrontal cortex
(mOFC), dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, and hippocampus.
This group also demonstrated the function of the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex, lateral OFC, and parietal cortex in the
anticipation of regret at the time that a choice was made.
Our study presents the first evidence that the cerebellum
has a role in the experience of regret. Notably, subjects with
cerebellar damage were not impaired with regard to regret-based
choice behavior. Conversely, cerebellar processing specifically
affected the self-monitoring of regret. In estimating regret in our
task, the obtained outcome (the factual, internal state) must be
compared with that of the foregone choice (i.e., its counterfactual
alternative, external event).
Comparing disparate states—motor or cognitive—has always
been considered the fundamental task of cerebellar function
(Molinari et al., 2009). Consistent with the literature on
estimating states, our findings support the model in which the
cerebellum has a significant function in monitoring changes in
one’s emotional state to represent negative emotions. This model
is described in depth in Figure 5.
Taking into account the etiological heterogeneity of the study
population, it will be interesting to analyze homogenous cohorts
of patients affected by focal cerebellar lesions in order to identify
whether specific cerebellar areas are involved in the proposed
model.
In our study, only self-rating regret was affected in patients;
self-rating of all other feelings were preserved. Regret is the only
feeling that arouses a sense of personal responsibility (Camille
et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005; Larquet et al., 2010), which
implicates self-attribution in feeling regret but not in other
positive and negative affective states that arise from decision-
making behavior. Relief, joy, and disappointment—but not
regret—even if produced by counterfactual reasoning, lead a
subject to believe that the result of his past decision is attributable
to external events.
According to this hypothesis, the lateral cerebellar hemisphere
shows enhanced activity in social situations implying the
internal attribution of negative feelings. Cerebellar involvement
is not evident when the causes of negative social events are
external (e.g., other people, situational conditions) (Blackwood
et al., 2003). Blackwood et al. (2003) proposed a model of
processing affective states, based on self-agency and other-
agency mechanisms. ‘‘Agency’’ refers to the sense of ownership
of actions or thoughts and is central to self -consciousness
(Gallagher, 2000). Self -agency implies the perception of self -
responsibility, whereas other-agency implies the perception
of other-responsibility. Notably, other-responsibility has been
associated with disappointment (Frijda et al., 1989; Van Dijk
et al., 1999), and self -agency and self -responsibility have
been linked strictly to regret. In this conceptual framework,
the specificity of the cerebellar influence on the self-rating
of regret and the sparing of self-rating of other feelings
(disappointment, joy, relief) can be interpreted, considering the
cerebellar component of biological substrate for processing self -
responsibility.
Impaired mentalization of the self, as hypothesized here,
has been observed in psychiatric pathologies (Ito, 2006, 2008;
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D’Angelo and Casali, 2013). Certain symptoms of schizophrenia
have been linked to the failure to compare internal and external
representations. As in depression, psychotic symptoms have
been regarded to be a loss of internal coherence between
internally and externally generated signals, with a consequent
dysregulation of mood homeostasis (D’Angelo and Casali, 2013).
Cerebellar dysfunction has been described in these diseases, and
the hypothesis that cerebellar processing might ultimately take
part in generating coherent representations of the world has been
advanced (Blakemore et al., 2000; Molinari et al., 2009).
According to this hypothesis, very recently by administering
the same paradigm of gambling task it has been demonstrated
that patients with high-functioning autism disclose a cognitive
and emotional behavior resembling that of patients affected by
cerebellar lesions (Zalla et al., 2014). Indeed, they show reduced
regret and no difference between regret and disappointment,
along with preserved counterfactual thinking and choice
behavior. The authors stated that ‘‘the experience of regret
crucially depends on the level of subjective responsibility and
on the personal sense of blame induced by the individual’s
own choice’’ and their data are ‘‘in accordance with research in
social cognition showing the existence of unconscious guidance
systems, composed by a variety of automatic process detecting
relevant stimuli and information in the social and physical
environments’’ (Zalla et al., 2014).
Taking into account that the cerebellum has been implicated
in autism spectrum disorders (ASDs; Fatemi et al., 2012)
with post-mortem studies showing cerebellar Purkinje cells
loss (Amaral et al., 2008) and neuroimaging data showing
specific cerebellar gray and white matter alterations in ASDs
patients (Scott et al., 2009), the present study is the first one to
demonstrates that the cerebellum has a central role in specific
components of social cognition.
According to this statement, Zalla et al.’s data are consistent
with evidence showing that alexithymia, considerably
overlapped with ASDs, is characterized by difficulties in
overtly use feeling to guide behavior. It is worth noting that
both in ASDs and alexithymia the impairment of amygdala
is crucial (Zalla and Sperduti, 2013; Laricchiuta et al., 2014)
and, in particular, alexithymia scores have been linked directly
with cerebellar areas and inversely with amygdale volume
and, more in general, with limbic and para-limbic system
(Laricchiuta et al., 2014).
All in all, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the cerebellum
is involved in behaviors related to not-cognitively processing
emotions.
Conclusion
The present study demonstrate for the first time the involvement
of the cerebellum in the self-rating of regret feelings.
This finding allows to hypothesize that the cerebellum, which
is deeply interconnected with the prefrontal cortex, limbic
system, and basal ganglia (Schutter and van Honk, 2005; Habas
et al., 2009), has a role in the processing of feelings that are linked
to the representation of the self and thus it might be involved in
social cognition processing.
A limit of the present study is the heterogeneity of the subjects.
Further investigation including an increasing sample size and
studying specific cerebellar cohorts may contribute to better
define the involvement of specific cerebellar portions within the
neural circuit of regret.
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